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Disasters present a unique challenge for the epidemiologic
research community. Disasters are almost always unexpect-
ed and their aftermath is typically characterized by a strain
on existing infrastructure and resources. These are not the
conditions under which the epidemiologic research com-
munity typically thrives. However, disasters by definition
affect large numbers of people and a growing body of
evidence suggests that the consequences of disasters can
include multiple health conditions (e.g., cardiovascular dis-
ease, respiratory disease, mental health problems), can be
far-reaching, and long-lasting (1–3). Although public
health departments and federal organizations such as the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provide
the first-line of evaluation and intervention after such
events, these agencies are typically overwhelmed by the
immediate needs after a mass disaster leaving much that
needs to be done. The epidemiologic research community
then has a unique role it can play after disasters, augmenting
the work of public health practitioners. To do so, epi-
demiologists must identify the most acute areas where they
can be of assistance, build on existing resources, and design
and implement studies much more quickly than is typical for
epidemiologic work. In this commentary we present exam-
ples from our own experience designing studies in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in
New York City and offer suggestions about the role aca-
demic epidemiologists can fruitfully play after disasters.
THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
government and disaster relief agencies started offering
services to the persons who were most directly affected by
the disaster, including those surviving and evacuating the
immediate zone of destruction, first responders, and the
families of the missing. However, for many weeks after
the disaster, the magnitude of its effects remained unknown
and best estimates were subject to continual revision. From
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360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010a public health point of view, it quickly became evident that
there were three primary questions that warranted rapid
assessment soon after the attacks: determining the impact of
the attacks on those in and around Ground Zero, assessing
the potential impact of the smoke plume from the burning
World Trade Center towers in the metropolitan area, and
documenting the psychological consequences of the attacks
in the general population.
THE WORK OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY
OF MEDICINE
In the first few days after the attack, in consultation with the
Commissioner of the New York City Department of Health,
we decided that the best use of our skills and resources would
be to assess the psychological impact of the disaster on the
population. Other research teams throughout the City started
to tackle issues related to the persons in and around Ground
Zero and to the environmental consequences of the plume.
We generated research aims, focusing on assessing the
prevalence and correlates of symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), panic attacks, depression, substance
use and abuse, and somatic complaints in the general popula-
tion with a particular focus on these symptoms in specific
groups, such as ethnic minorities and children. Optimistic
that telephone communications would be restored quickly,
we decided to use random digit phone survey methodology
based on our previous experience with the technique and the
ability of telephone surveys to efficiently sample the general
population. We developed a collaboration with researchers at
the Medical University of South Carolina who had prior ex-
perience in post-disaster research. A protocol was submitted
for institutional review board approval and the decision was
made to have two-tiered mental health backup available,
including psychiatrists available on pager to offer assistance to
survey respondents assessed to require immediate attention.
Training of interviewers and a pilot test refined the survey (4).
With no clear funding in place, we staked our core funding on
getting the project started and applied for an administrative
supplement from existing National Institutes of Health
(NIH) grants. We obtained partial funding through an NIH
supplement to an existing grant and from a foundation days
before the first survey started 5 weeks after the disaster.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS DOCUMENTED IN
OUR WORK THUS FAR
Our first assessment showed that we were able to recruit
a sample that mirrored the 2000 Census and that 7.5% of1047-2797/04/$–see front matter
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533adults living south of 110th Street in Manhattan had symp-
toms consistent with probable PTSD (5). This was approx-
imately three times higher than what might have been the
expected background prevalence of PTSD. We also docu-
mented a higher-than-expected prevalence of symptoms of
major depression (5). Recognizing that this first assessment
only covered the initial period after disaster, and was
restricted to a small part of New York City, we planned for,
and implemented, assessments 4 months and 6 months after
the disaster with the second survey expanded to the five
boroughs of New York City, and the third to the New York
metropolitan area, over-sampling Manhattan to allow
analysis of trends from the first survey. The results across
the three surveys showed samples that mirrored the 2000
Census for respective areas sampled, and a decrease in
symptom prevalence as time progressed, suggesting resolu-
tion of PTSD for more than two-thirds of those meeting
original criteria in the first 6 months (6). Importantly, we
found that one quarter of those interviewed were ‘‘directly
exposed’’ to the attacks, and, as expected, the prevalence of
PTSD was higher among those directly exposed compared
with other residents. However, the prevalence of PTSD
among the less (or indirectly) exposed was not trivial, and
these prevalences applied to population totals suggested that
the number of persons with symptoms consistent with PTSD
who were directly exposed to the attacks was similar to the
total number of persons with PTSD who were indirectly
exposed (6). This suggested that attention to mental health
was important not only for those in the immediate impact
zone and their families, but also to a broader class of
residents of a disaster area, a relatively new and perhaps
controversial observation in the field. While the first survey
was performed in Manhattan only, because of limited time
and funding but also because of a sense that this would be the
area most heavily affected by the disaster, the prevalence of
PTSD was as high in the surrounding boroughs, further
supporting the notion that mental health consequences are
widespread after large disasters (7). We note that several
other research groups have performed critically important
work in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
and our work has built on insights from these research teams
(8–11). While in the context of this personal reflection we
do not comment on the work of others in detail we refer the
reader to published summaries of post-September 11 re-
search that discusses this other work in more detail (12, 13).
LESSONS FOR THE EPIDEMIOLOGIC
RESEARCH COMMUNITY FROM THE
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS
There are a number of lessons for the epidemiologic research
community that arise from the September 11 terrorist
attacks and the response to them. First, in the immediatepost-disaster period, our primary responsibility is to ensure
the safety and well-being of students, staff, and faculty. This
may seem self-evident, but may easily be forgotten as a large
disaster unfolds. In the context of the September 11 attacks,
the entire City was at a standstill after the attacks, and the
disaster dominated public discourse, work, and most aspects
of life in New York City for months thereafter. The sheer
number of people who worked in the World Trade Center
complex meant that there were several friends or family
members of persons who were directly affected by the
disaster who were in our team. In addition, the perceived
political nature of the attacks, and the inevitable discussions
about its roots and potential retribution, brought to the fore
political differences between members of our research team
that had to be addressed and dealt with. The combination of
personal grieving and flaring tempers is challenging and
needs a substantial investment of time and effort to address.
Second, it is important, relatively quickly after a disaster,
to invest the time and effort to preserve and stabilize
ongoing projects. Storing copies of data off-site, frequently
taught and perhaps sometimes not practiced as routinely as
it should be, is critical when considering the potential of
a disaster to wipe out years of work in an instant. As critical
as keeping data safely, project infrastructure, within the
confines of what is possible after a disaster, should be tended
and preserved. A number of projects we carry out in New
York City involve community collaboration. With the
breakdown in telecommunications and the all-consuming
nature of the disaster, shoring up project activities within
local community agencies to ensure that projects could
resume when appropriate, became critical.
Third, epidemiology research teams can bring both skills
and potentially tangible resources to the disaster response.
Public health departments are likely to be overwhelmed
quickly by a massive disaster and eager to accept help. In the
absence of a service provision function, epidemiologic re-
search teams can offer both assessment skills and potentially
project personnel who could carry out tasks to assist public
agencies. For example, at the time of the September 11
disasters we had just started an investigation of out-of-
hospital cardiac arrests, working in concert with the New
York City Fire Department (FDNY). Clearly, the project
had to be suspended immediately after the attacks.
However, the investigators and project managers directing
this research, in consultation with the relevant FDNY
assistant commissioner, were able to realign our data
collectors’ task to assist in the recovery effort; our team
then took upon itself the responsibility of tracking FDNY
staff and their families for the weeks immediately after the
disaster. We returned to the project’s intended function 6
months after September 11. In terms of assessment skills, the
research we described earlier in this commentary started at
the behest of the New York Department of Health to
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need in New York City. Epidemiologic skills became para-
mount to launch a rapid assessment that was ultimately used
by the City in their successful application for funding to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Fourth, there are areas where our understanding of the
consequences of particular disasters is clearly lacking and
which may, as such, represent the more suitable place for the
application of research skills. In the context of the Sep-
tember 11 disaster, it became clear early on that the gap in
our appreciation of the consequences of the disaster did not
concern the persons who were directly exposed to the event,
but rather the consequences in the general population. Prior
research, conducted after the Oklahoma City bombing of
the Murray Federal Building, had provided good estimates of
what could be expected in terms of psychopathology among
direct victims of this disaster (14), but there was very little
published that could provide an estimate of the population
burden of this disaster. As such, an area of clear need
emerged to which we were able to apply epidemiologic
methods to assist in the recovery effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The epidemiologic research community is not accustomed
to acting quickly. In the context of an unanticipated, un-
precedented disaster, the rapid design and implementation
of a study was necessary if we were to contribute to the
recovery effort in a meaningful way. Unfortunately, disasters
are relatively common (15), and it is likely that there will be
more, rather than fewer, unanticipated events in future
where epidemiologic skills can serve an important function.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, municipal
health departments across the country, the CDC, and the
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps substantially
revised policies regarding disaster response, deployability of
officers, and training of staff. The epidemiologic research
community has a similar opportunity to prepare itself for
future disaster eventualities. In the aftermath of September
11, 2001 it became rapidly clear that there existed a dearth
of mechanisms for conducting rapid assessments and for
documenting the consequences of such an event in the
general population. We suggest that improved infrastructure
that will allow more efficient mobilization of responses to
future events is needed. This will involve a concerted effort
by academic institutions to have resources available to allow
rapid deployment of epidemiologic studies, and that funders
be ready to make review and funding available more quickly
than extant ‘‘rapid’’ mechanisms (that frequently take at
least 6 months to receive funding). Also, we need to ensure
that epidemiology training prepares students for the pos-sibility that their skills will be needed in these events and
that students are equipped with skills in different assessment
techniques that will allow them to participate in such efforts
in future. We hope that the lessons we learned and our
experiences in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks
never need to be extended to others, but suggest that they
probably ought not to be ignored.
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